


Reducing Insecurity in Africa

Roles and Responsibilities of the U.S. Military, U.S. Government and Non-Governmental Communities

Jessica Piombo



April 2012

Workshop Report

**Naval Postgraduate School ♦ Center on Contemporary Conflict
PASCC Report 2012 005**

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Reducing Insecurity in Africa

Roles and Responsibilities of the U.S. Military, U.S. Government and Non-Governmental Communities

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All opinions and factual errors in this report are the authors' own. Please direct any questions either to the specific panelists or to the project lead, Jessica Piombo (jrpiombo@nps.edu).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The workshop titled *Reducing Insecurity in Africa: Roles and Responsibilities of the U.S. Military, U.S. Government and Non-Government Communities* was held in Monterey, California in December 2010. Sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School, this conference focused on the respective roles of military, government civilian, and non-governmental actors in bridging security and development processes in Africa.

We organized this conference because of the debates that had been ignited over the creation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in February 2007. An expansive conception of security and the roles that military actors should take in providing security informed the early deliberations over AFRICOM's roles and missions. AFRICOM's creators proclaimed that it would be a new kind of combatant command, one that took a "whole of government" approach to Africa, and one in which the Department of Defense (DoD) working in close collaboration with the Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and other partners. AFRICOM would engage in a wide range of activities that extended far beyond the narrow confines of national security, and it would attempt to take an extremely proactive stance in responding to and working with African concerns. To AFRICOM, security included not just the traditional concepts of state-centric national security conceived of in military terms (arms rivalries, strategic alliances, defense and military training), but also dimensions of human security: individual security and human rights, economic prosperity, societal reconstruction and stabilization, regional organization development, and capacity building for states and their institutions.

The attention that AFRICOM devoted to capacity building and related programs therefore sparked intense debate. Many were concerned about the "securitization" or militarization of U.S. policy in Africa; others were concerned about the blurring of boundaries between development and security programs; and a final set found the interagency aspect of AFRICOM's new orientation troubling. Without assessment of the command as it has been operating, however, these discussions remain at the conceptual level and tend to circle around the same sets of unresolved arguments. Therefore, we initiated this conference in order to generate concrete discussion of the nature of security and insecurity in Africa, how to address those problems, and assess the programs that AFRICOM has initiated that bridge the development-security divide.

Process

In June 2010, we issued a call for papers. The solicitations went to academics, U.S. government civilians, U.S. military organizations, and non-governmental organizations, both within and outside the USA. We aimed to bring together individuals from various communities who had interacted with AFRICOM or had experience with their programs, and who desired to reflect on their experiences by assessing the command's activities in three areas. We received over 100 applications and selected approximately 25 papers to be presented at the conference. Our final participant list included individuals from USAID, the State Department, the U.S. military, think

tanks, universities in the USA and Africa, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Each participant wrote a conference paper that was made available to participants before the workshop, presented and discussed in a three-day event.

The conversations across these various communities yielded a set of findings and recommendations for how to address the lines between various actors within the U.S. government, how to create programs that build on the complementarities between various actors (within and outside the government), and what recurring issues continually challenge the generation of productive interactions between these different actors. The highlights are presented below, and more expansive descriptions of the panels, presentations and discussions are found within the full conference report. The papers are being collected into an edited volume for publication.

Primary Findings

On the Nature of Stability and Security in Africa...

1. Traditional notions of security based upon upholding the rationale of state borders do not hold sway in most African contexts, and governments and governance deficits cause many of Africa's security challenges. Considering security at the human level can move past problems rooted in bad governance, uneven development, exclusion, and rights abuses at the state level.
2. The "developmental challenge" in addressing insecurity in Africa takes two main forms. The first is addressing the economic and governance issues that create human and state-level insecurities. The second is the need to build up the human, institutional and infrastructural capacity within African security actors, agencies and sectors.
3. Stability is dependent upon the mutually constitutive elements of security, governance, and development. Many feel that each of these dimensions is best addressed by specific actors, but that the interconnectedness of these three necessitates that actors work together to create a synergistic outcome. This is the essence of the "whole of government" approach to security and development.

On the Nature of Coordination among USG Programs and Actors...

1. One of the biggest challenges for interagency coordination is the **complexity among interagency organizational structures, cultures, time-horizons, funding and staffing levels, operating procedures and mandates**. Despite knowledge of these issues across various agencies, they still continue to impair working relationships. Knowing the nature of the coordination problem has yet to translate into enduring and institutionalized (i.e., not ad hoc) solutions.
 - Communication problems particularly impact the development of interagency relationships. Along with having difficulties speaking the same language, agencies need to actually open the lines of communication between each other.

Misperceptions exist in regards to organizational capabilities and programs between each agency.

- Different **organizational traits and cultures** also create serious challenges when U.S. military, USG civilian and non-governmental actors attempt to cooperate. More productive ends with less waste can be created when various actors make the effort to learn how to work together and alter their processes to facilitate coordination.
 - AFRICOM has seen **success in creating cooperation** across USG agencies in health programs when the military side has consciously sought to modify its programs to more closely align with USAID processes and expectations. This can serve as an example for other programs.
- 2. The **expansion of the civil affairs and capacity building** missions within AFRICOM have been **viewed as an encroachment** into what was seen by many in the diplomatic and development communities as their exclusive roles.
 - There are serious concerns from the Department of State, USAID and NGOs about the fact that U.S. military personnel are not trained in development or true capacity and institution building, that the DoD does not have the time horizon built into its programs that true development projects necessitate, and that the DoD engages in “developmental” activities for strategic ends.
 - These differences are part of why integration, or at least cooperation and coordination, are necessary to create **layered programs** that will have lasting effects in truly addressing African security challenges.
 - The question often arises, however, of **who should lead coordination**. Some feel that AFRICOM can serve as an essential organization to coordinate and facilitate future US-led stabilization projects in Africa. Others are less convinced, and the inability of AFRICOM’s leadership to generate a clear purpose and mission for the command has made it more difficult to find resolution on this.
- 3. **Chronic imbalances in human and financial resources** between the three main USG agencies (the DoD, Department of State, and USAID) deeply impair the ability to generate cooperative relationships, particularly the development and deployment of programs and the sharing of information. These issues are un-changeable in the short term and must therefore be planned for and worked around, while executive and legislative channels are worked to remedy the situation in the longer term.

Recommendations

1. **“Coordinate but differentiate.”** Actors should each work in their areas of expertise and to their comparative advantage, while integrating into an overall coordinated project. When AFRICOM makes the effort to coordinate and differentiate, as it has in health programs, productive outcomes can be achieved.
 - The DoD will need to acknowledge where and when other agencies should be in the lead, and develop strategies to support their efforts rather than attempt to replace them.

- Aligning DoD programs with existing and planned initiatives pursued by USAID and DoS can help to provide a long-term outlook to defense programs, despite personnel and funding fluctuations.
 - Actors that work in this arena need to **develop a common lexicon**, at best, or at minimum, a more sustained awareness that terms and concepts are not universal.
2. AFRICOM staff should work within the DoD to **fix the structural issues that limit interaction** with civilians and NGOs.
 3. Ultimately, the **resource imbalance between civilian and military agencies** will have to be addressed for sustained cooperation.
 - DoD actors often assume that DoS and USAID personnel do not want to go on assignment with the military or cooperate with military-led programs. Our participants noted that lack of cooperation is often not an issue of will but of **resources and rules**. This may be due to bureaucratic issues related to resource levels, funding/spending constraints, career incentives, and the timelines and processes of civilian appointments. A better understanding of the processes and constraints of each agency would help the various actors find ways to work with or around these potential constraints.
 4. Civilian agencies will eventually need to generate career incentives that motivate their staff to accept assignments at AFRICOM and other combatant commands, in order to encourage and facilitate regular exchanges between staffs.

Concluding Thoughts and Way Forward

The fact that our participants engaged in frank discussions of what has worked and what continues to hinder interagency cooperation, and that they then could take this experience back to their home agencies, was the first and most important outcome of this workshop. A second significant success was that the participants aired their opinions and listened to each others' perspectives. Even when they disagreed, learning why disagreements surfaced helped advance mutual understanding.

Finally, **the consistency of coordination challenges uncovered, and the discovery of some successes in ways of engaging across agencies and with African partners, was important.** Participants noted that none of their findings were “path breaking” in the sense that none had been aware of them previously. But the consistency of the issues that arose, regardless of the type of program being analyzed, was marked.

Given this, the panelists felt it is time to move beyond the rhetoric of noting problems and to **identify and institutionalize non-ad hoc ways of engaging productively across the range of actors** - governmental and non-governmental - to enhance both U.S. and African security at the interstate, national and human levels.

ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APS	Africa Partnership Station
CA	Civil Affairs
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa
COIN	Counter Insurgency
DATT	Defense Attache
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HAO	Humanitarian Assistance Other
HCA	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HoA	Horn of Africa
IUU	Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (Fishing)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OEF-TS	Operation Enduring Freedom, Trans Sahara
PRP	Pandemic Response Program
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SOCAFRICA / SOCAF	Special Operations Command Africa
SCRAT	Sociocultural Analysis Team
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
TSC	Theater Security Cooperation
TSCTP	Trans Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership
USA	United States Army
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSOF	United States Special Operations Forces

CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVES OF THE WORKSHOP

In December 2010, the Naval Postgraduate School hosted a workshop that assessed the various roles played by different actors involved in projects that span the nexus between development and security in Africa. The project was supported by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA-ASCO), which at the time ran a separate, parallel project on mapping and projecting the terrain of non-traditional security threats in Africa. The workshop that NPS convened oriented from the following basic issue: in regions where any efforts to reduce insecurity will fail without addressing fundamental issues such as poverty, inequality, corruption and poor governance, what are the respective roles of military, non-military governmental, and non-governmental actors? Where does “development” end and “security and stabilization” begin?

The motivation for this workshop came from the diverse reactions to the creation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM or U.S. Africa Command). In February 2007, U.S. Africa Command was announced with much fanfare, and its initial planners claimed that the command would take a new, fresh, "holistic" approach to U.S. government efforts in Africa (sentiment found in the earlier, more expansive statements about the command), or at least in the realm of African security assistance (in the later, more reserved pronouncements). Yet the United States military's non-kinetic, development-based approach to engaging with African countries was quickly and widely criticized by development experts, the NGO community, and observers wary of militarizing U.S. foreign policy in Africa. The questions feed into a meta-debate about whether the choice is development *or* security, or whether U.S. foreign policy seeks to create development *for* security.

In an environment where most security problems are complex issues, development and security are deeply intertwined. What then is the role of the U.S. military in Africa and what are suitable military approaches to African security? Defining the roles and responsibilities of various actors – U.S. military, U.S. government non-military, international organizations, non-governmental organizations – becomes part and parcel of defining the challenge of finding sustainable and long-term solutions to the political and regional instabilities that plague Africa and prevent the continent from truly realizing its full potential for economic and political development. This workshop investigated these various issues through a set of solicited papers that were presented in a small, participation-focused workshop format.

Given the amount of time that had passed, the conference organizers felt that we were at a timely point to re-engage the roles and responsibilities debate. There were concrete experiences to analyze about where and how the respective U.S. government and non-governmental actors have been operating in the new policy landscape. In this spirit, the

workshop attempted to focus on completed activities, identifying the various actors who have engaged in programs to address security concerns through engagements that span the development-security divide. Participants were largely self-identified: in June - July 2010, we issued a call for proposals and received over 90 paper abstracts. Of these, approximately 25 were selected for presentation at the workshop.

Day one laid the groundwork and set the terms of debate for the following two days. Presenters were sought from the academic and practitioner communities, to present context-setting papers that would facilitate discussions about the nature of security issues in Africa; to sort through the human versus traditional security debate; assess how the changing nature of war and conflict blurs the line between the two types of security; and finally to analyze what this means for the distinction between development and security.

The presentations and discussions on this day focused on the specific issues just raised. This day's panels were primarily conducted at the conceptual and academic levels, framing the debate in terms of the linkages between development and security, what development requires to be effective (time horizon, local ownership, relationship building, etc), and whether there are "shortcuts" to ensure security can be effective without adhering to all the lessons of development.

Day two moved the discussion into the realm of concrete experience. Presenters on this day were asked to utilize the frameworks developed in the papers that were presented on the first day to structure their contributions. The presentations and papers on the second day focused on the practical nature of how engagements unfold on the ground, and what effects these engagements contribute to the security-development nexus. When planning projects that aim to reduce insecurity through development, how do project implementers keep these mutual, but separate goals in mind? How do practitioners measure the impact of their projects, and what measures have they taken to integrate efforts across the various communities?

Day three attempted to filter the debates from the first two days into a coherent set of practical lessons in terms of how development and security tie together, in what circumstances cooperation works, and what circumstances produce unbridled competition and negative results. Participants gathered into small working groups, each focusing on an issue raised in the papers. The working groups were tasked with identifying permanent tensions that exist, devising potential solutions to these tensions and associated problems, and generating a set of lessons and guidelines for achieving future success. Particular attention was placed on formation of policy at the COCOM level and below. Some of the discussions on the third day delved into interagency alignment and shortcomings of strategic vision. The working groups were asked to shape their discussions towards reviewing the roles and responsibilities debate as referenced in terms of the security-development nexus.

Section One: Background, Concept and Objectives

In the aftermath of the workshop, participants have been revising their papers to be published as an edited volume (please send inquiries to Jessica Piombo). This report is meant to capture the spirit of the presentations and related discussion, and to serve as a briefing document to U.S. government and other audiences interested in the proceedings.

BACKGROUND

When the United States Command for Africa was created in February 2007, security was broadly conceived. AFRICOM trumpeted that it would be a new kind of combatant command, one that took a “whole of government” approach to Africa. The organization would engage in a wide range of activities that extended far beyond the narrow confines of national security, and it would attempt to take an extremely proactive stance in responding to and working with African concerns. To AFRICOM, security included not just the traditional concepts of state-centric national security conceived of in military terms (arms rivalries, strategic alliances, defense and military training), but also dimensions of human security: individual security and human rights, economic prosperity, societal reconstruction and stabilization, regional organization development, and capacity building for states and their institutions.

In recognition of these factors, the United States Department of Defense established AFRICOM with a mandate that prioritized the soft side of security. As the mission and operating concept of AFRICOM took shape, its scope of activities began to include programs devoted to capacity building, humanitarian and civic assistance, natural disaster response, and “stabilization” activities that encompassed a significant component of infrastructure projects and economic development-style programs. AFRICOM would seek to build African capacity for non-kinetic and limited military missions, emphasizing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, medical assistance, security cooperation, and capacity building. The command would be primarily oriented toward theater security cooperation and be capable of only limited military operations, requiring external support for large missions.

AFRICOM’s creation quickly ignited a fierce public debate that was controversial and polarizing. The activist and non-governmental organization (NGO) communities immediately proclaimed that AFRICOM would militarize U.S. foreign policy in Africa, eclipsing development and governance efforts from the NGO communities, State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). These concerns had some basis: U.S. military programs in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel included significant developmental aspects alongside more traditional projects and activities such as military training. In both of these areas, the U.S. military has been engaging in what it calls “humanitarian and civic assistance” (HCA).

The outsider, HCA projects seem to be developmentally focused: they build or refurbish water wells, schools and health clinics; provide medical, dental and veterinary services; all with the goal of strengthening local societies. These projects can be included in a counter-insurgency strategy or be used to help stabilize an area and reduce insecurity. HCA has long been part of the toolkit of the Civil Affairs community of the U.S. Army; but since the end of the Vietnam era, the Civil Affairs community had been increasingly

sidelined and diminished in size. Yet with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, this all changed. With a new project of “nation building,” the U.S. military began engaging in civil affairs-type projects on a grand scale, alongside major combat operations. The provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs, in both Afghanistan and Iraq) were the most formal manifestation of these efforts, but in reality U.S. military forces had been informally conducting governance and economic rehabilitation projects as part of their daily duties for some time before the creation of the first PRT.

AFRICOM’s creation was received with this experience in the backdrop, though this time the military role was unprecedented: the United States has never taken an active, sustained military posture within the African continent. To the development and humanitarian assistance communities that had been the forefront of U.S. engagement in Africa, the military’s new role seemed to alarmingly blur the boundaries between defense and development.

The issues at the heart of the critique of U.S. Africa Command's creation, many of which were taken up in the workshop, had all been raised well before the announcement of the new command. The U.S. military's leading role in the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, along with its expanding role in disaster response had raised alarms in many quarters about the “proper” lead for “nation building” and related efforts. In Africa, these debates had been spurred by the operations of the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism Partnership, the Africa Partnership Station, and similar programs that had been operating throughout the first decade of the 21st century. These programs all have attempted to reduce insecurity in Africa by combining traditional theater security cooperation and military-focused training with more developmentally oriented programs that provide “humanitarian assistance” to vulnerable communities.¹

¹ To the U.S. military, “humanitarian assistance” refers to a set of five distinct programs. Only one of these is the same type of “humanitarian assistance” as the phrase is understood by the nongovernmental community: disaster response. The U.S. military runs programs under the HA rubric that include (1) Humanitarian Demining Assistance; (2) Humanitarian Assistance - Excess Property Program (HA EP); (3) Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA); (4) Humanitarian Assistance Other (HAO); and (5) Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) programs. OHDACA projects are funded directly through regional combatant commanders to enable them to respond to disasters and promote post-conflict reconstruction through “unobtrusive, low-cost, but highly efficacious” projects (Christopher Griffin, “A Working Plan,” *Armed Forces Journal*, issue 4, 2007. Access at: <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/04/2587549>, verified June 24, 2011). The other HA programs are administered and overseen by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and information about them can be accessed at <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm> (verified on June 24, 2011). Within its first year, AFRICOM developed an internal document describing these programs, their statutory authorities and funding cycles, and instructing how each should be utilized within the command's area of responsibility, “FY08 – Humanitarian Assistance Program Standard Operating Procedures,” which is accessible through <https://www.ohasis.org>. There are also two U.S. government/DoD programs designed for natural disaster response – the Foreign Humanitarian Disaster Response program and the Commanders Emergency Relief Funds (CERP). Government and economic reconstruction efforts are funded separately; these are the 1206, 1207 and 1210 programs that fund the provincial reconstruction

Development and Security: What actors, roles and projects will achieve desired end-states?

One of the primary difficulties for the U.S. military in responding to these criticisms is that in regions like Africa any efforts to reduce insecurity will fail without addressing fundamental issues such as poverty, inequality, corruption and poor governance. Therefore, important questions arise about the respective roles of military, non-military governmental and non-governmental actors in these endeavors. Where does “development” end and “security and stabilization” begin? The debate over these issues raged throughout 2007 and early 2008, as many interested parties took sides on whether AFRICOM would do more harm than good as it began to assume responsibility for U.S. military and security engagement with Africa. Multiple conferences were held at the time, but by necessity they were all speculative, as AFRICOM had not yet begun operations.

Just as humanitarian assistance has come under fire in the past few years for inadvertently enabling the spread of war, the military’s non-kinetic, development-based approach has been widely criticized by development experts, the NGO community, and observers wary of militarizing U.S. foreign policy in Africa. The questions feed into a meta-debate about whether the choice is development OR security, or whether U.S. foreign policy seeks to create development FOR security.

In an environment where most security problems are complex security issues – involving both natural and man-made causes – development and security are deeply intertwined. In this scenario, what is the role of the U.S. military in Africa and what are suitable military approaches to African security? Defining the roles and responsibilities of various actors – U.S. military, U.S. government non-military, international organizations, non-governmental organizations – becomes part and parcel of defining the challenge of finding sustainable and long-term solutions to the political and regional instabilities that plague Africa and prevent the continent from truly realizing its full potential for economic and political development.

teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. Each of these programs has distinct goals, requirements and funding streams.

WORKSHOP INTRODUCTION

Opening Remarks by Jessica Piombo, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School
December 1, 2010

We are here to focus in depth on a set of issues revolving around the intersection of development and security in Africa, and the operation, goals and effects of U.S. government programs that function in that mixed space. The issues we will focus on cover the nature of security and insecurity in Africa, the relationship between human/individual and state security, how development and security relate to one another, interagency coordination within the USG, and interactions between the U.S. government and nongovernmental actors.

One of the primary difficulties for the U.S. military in thinking about how to engage with African countries is that in a place like the continent of Africa, any efforts to reduce insecurity will fail without addressing fundamental issues such as poverty, inequality, corruption and poor governance. Yet addressing these issues are not traditional roles of the military, and many debate whether an expanded military role should include activities in these realms. Therefore, important questions arise about the respective roles of military, non-military governmental and non-governmental actors in addressing insecurity in Africa.

Where does “development” end and “security and stabilization” begin? U.S. Africa Command’s creation in 2007 spurred a raging debate over these issues, as many interested parties took sides on whether AFRICOM would do more harm than good as it began to assume responsibility for U.S. military and security engagement with Africa. Multiple conferences were held at the time, but by necessity they were all speculative, as AFRICOM had not yet begun operations.

Just as humanitarian assistance has come under fire in the past for inadvertently enabling the spread of war, the military’s non-kinetic, development-based approach has been widely criticized by development experts, the NGO community, and observers wary of militarizing U.S. foreign policy in Africa. The questions feed into a meta-debate about whether the choice is development OR security, or whether U.S. foreign policy seeks to create development FOR security.

In an environment where most security problems are complex security issues – involving both natural and man-made causes – development and security are deeply intertwined. Responding to these issues necessitates a developmental and capacity building approach.

All of these dynamics have led to a set of programs designed to reduce insecurity by involving multiple U.S. and non-governmental actors in a policy approach that provides

- Humanitarian and/or civic assistance;
- Capacity building – governmental, military, economic;
- Security sector reform – not just military, but the institutions of the rule of law as well;
- Medical assistance and training;
- Maritime security strengthening; and
- Peacekeeping training.

Some of these have involved the U.S. military in programs that others would consider to be more properly within the realm of development – support for education and healthcare, for example. In these programs, military personnel build or refurbish schools and medical buildings, build municipal trash systems, and provide basic medical and veterinary support. This is just a sample of the types of activities in which military teams engage, but is enough to show that clearly these are not within the scope of traditional military missions. Critics accuse the military of engaging in development through these projects, though most development experts would hesitate to label them genuine developmental efforts.

These debates lead to a series of discussions about what is (and/or should be) the role of the U.S. military in Africa and what are suitable military approaches to African security? How does the military effectively work within a genuinely integrated, whole of government approach? How does it work in an integrated, multiple-government, multiple-agency, governmental and non-governmental approach?

Defining the roles and responsibilities of various actors – U.S. military, U.S. government non-military, international organizations, non-governmental organizations – becomes part and parcel of defining the challenge of finding sustainable and long-term solutions to the political and regional instabilities that plague Africa and prevent the continent from truly realizing its full potential for economic and political development. Our challenge here, in this workshop, is to look at the broad scope of these issues but then to narrow in on assessments of actual programs that have been enacted – the CJTF-HOA, security sector reform and capacity building, humanitarian and civic assistance programs. The U.S. government, U.S. military and AFRICOM have been at this for a sufficient time to start reflecting on the outcomes that have been achieved, the challenges faced, and the continuing challenges that need to be overcome – or if they cannot – recognized and managed.

Ultimately, we want to focus on the issue of the different actors involved in programs that aim to reduce insecurity in Africa.

- Who are the main agents in these programs?
- What are their various tasks and responsibilities?

Section One: Background, Concept and Objectives

- How do the different agencies interact with one another? Not just how *well*, but *how* in general and in specific types of activities?
- What issues and debates arise from the involvement of military actors in missions that seem to be developmental in nature or orientation?
- This gets to the roles and responsibilities aspect of our workshop.

You all here have written papers that speak to almost all of these different issues. We arranged the workshop schedule in a way that attempted to bring out the various issues and dimensions and to stimulate discussion. That is the spirit of this workshop – to discuss these issues, facilitated by the work you all have done and the presentations you will give.

PANEL ONE: CONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY IN AFRICA

Panel One was designed to present and develop different concepts of security in Africa. Panelists discussed the nature of traditional and human security, and ways of thinking about how power is exercised in various states of peace and conflict. Terrence Lyons, a professor at George Mason University in Washington DC, argued that the question of security in Africa is essentially a political one. There are distinct forms of governance that underlie systems of rule, whether those are peaceful or violent forms of governance. A critical element in managing conflict is ensuring governance has rules and institutions that are strong and legitimate, and which reinforce peace rather than incentivize violence. Lyons argued that a prevalent form of conflict in Africa—civil wars—do not represent the presence of anarchy, but represent systems of governance based on fear and predation that reward violence versus cooperation.

A genuine understanding of the political underpinnings of both conflict and peace is an important, often overlooked, dynamic in analyses of security and insecurity. It is the nature of governance that links individuals and states in both peace and conflict, and particularly, in the transitions between peace and conflict. David Walter Dongo presented an overview of the notion of traditional versus human security, and argued that notions of human security and traditional security need to be addressed as separate but equally weighted concepts to improve conditions. The changing global paradigm since the end of WWII has shown a more limited role for traditional security approaches in Africa and has forced a shifting emphasis towards human security. Illustrated in reports such as the 1994 United Nations Development Program's Human Development Report, human security has forced a widening of the security paradigm to include threats to economies, food, health, environment, individuals and communities. Dongo suggested that a change is needed from a top-down focus on security to a bottom-up engagement that will better incorporate the objectives of human security.

This panel served as an important introduction to subsequent panels allowing participants the ability to address underlying assumptions of what is meant by security, who is the securitized actor, and whose security is being provided for?

Participants and Objectives

In this panel Terrence Lyons, George Mason University, presented research on how distinct systems of governance are associated with particular phases of conflict in Africa. David Walter Dongo, Afrikan Community Empowerment Program, presented on the relationship between traditional and human notions of security. Laura Perazzola moderated the panel.

Panel Narrative

Lyons argued that governance is a key element in conflict mitigation. Like regimes on the international scale, governance has norms and patterns of behavior that generate

specific political opportunity structures and hence reward specific political and military strategies. Governance that effectively manages conflict and prevents wide-scale violence depends upon well-understood and widely accepted rules of interaction and a set of norms and institutions that reinforce these rules. These rules and norms are embedded in society and develop path dependent patterns of repression and violence. A critical element in managing conflict is ensuring governance has rules and institutions that are strong and legitimate. Lyons argued that civil wars do not represent the presence of anarchy; but rather alternative systems of governance based on fear and predation that reward violence versus cooperation. Governance does not require government per se, as evidenced in Somalia where an informal array of business groups, traditional authorities, and civic groups converge to provide governance. Governments that have the capacity to juggle the contradictory pressures and ordeals of prolonged conflict learn flexibility and resilience and adapt to the imperatives of wartime governance. Understanding that there is a logic to conflict in which new norms and institutions develop that perpetuate violence, is critical to finding pathways from peace to conflict and back again.

Dongo argued there are diverging views of traditional and human security, but that both present forms of vulnerability for communities in Africa. Traditional security focuses on state capability in protecting state interests and perceived internal and external threats to those interests. Traditional security during the Cold War was based upon balance of power demands between U.S. and Soviet interests. This brought relative stability and coherence to the security paradigm in Africa as states could align with great powers and receive economic, military, and political benefits in kind. However, as the Cold War ended and balance of power politics receded, African regimes lost external support and the capability to manage internal conflict due to environmental, socioeconomic, or structural problems. The changing global paradigm displayed weaknesses with traditional security approaches in Africa and forced a shifting emphasis towards human security. Joining the international lexicon through the seminal 1994 United Nations Development Program's Human Development Report, the concept of human security broadened the scope of security to include threats on economies, food, health, environment, individuals and communities. Dongo suggested that a change is needed from a top-down focus on security to a bottom-up engagement that will better incorporate the objectives of human security.

The discussion period opened with an anecdote about the establishment of an Office of Food Security within USAID and how, conceptually, this move was ultimately a crossing of traditional streams of responsibility, accountability, and funding. This led to a short recap of the 3-D approach to foreign policy (defense, development, & diplomacy) and a quip: "as long as the other organization takes care of the other two 'd'-s we'll take care of ours." While slightly facetious, this sheds light on a thread that ran throughout other discussions as well: the interagency is challenged by overlapping respective roles in the mission set and capability to access resources of the other.

One question from the floor addressed Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Lyons argued that while all peace agreements are imperfect documents, they often are the best that can be done under the pressures that exist at the time they are negotiated. Lyons noted that in Sudan, the international community did not seem to display the commitment to enforce a peace externally, and that it fell to the Northern and Southern Sudanese to "get the politics right" and be less reliant on long term United Nations, African Union, or AFRICOM support. He highlighted that AFRICOM's role should remain foremost in support of political engagement.

Dongo suggested that AFRICOM's involvement, as a military command, was definitely not the answer. In a situation like Sudan, he suggested that uniformed military involvement brings with it very serious pre-conceived notions which unnecessarily undermine human security. He cited the example of human rights abuses by Ugandan military personnel in Northern Uganda, which rendered any involvement of uniformed personnel as illegitimate to local populations. In this case, military support to diplomatic initiatives or peace processes has the potential to undermine the security process.

While the line of questioning was abbreviated by the time limit on the panel, the conversation opened into a discussion of how the militaries should partner with NGOs and non-military organizations to assist in accomplishing the diplomacy and development aspects of the 3-D approach; the areas the military is not specifically best trained for and experienced with. This emphasized a re-occurring theme of the panel that focused on the perception of boundaries. Boundaries exist between urban and rural, elite and communal as well as between and within agencies operating in conflict zones. While some solutions were explored, such as military (host-nation and U.S.) working with NGOs, it was clear that a deeper understanding of the respective players' limitations needed to occur before those avenues would be viable to reduce insecurity in Africa.

PANEL TWO: INTERSECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY I - CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

This panel addressed the roots of security and insecurity in Africa by examining two relationships: how stability enhances development, and how one particular security threat, transnational organized crime, undermines development. In Joseph Siegle's presentation, Siegle asked how a legitimate, effective, and accountable state can be built so that it can deliver security and social services to its citizens and, thereby, maintain stability over time? He argued that there is already considerable experience that international actors can utilize to guide the development aspects of stabilization efforts, but what is lacking are African security forces that are familiar with and capable of implementing a disciplined counter-insurgency campaign. In addition, more adequate African and international institutions are needed to facilitate the integration of various stabilization efforts. Siegle concluded that focus should be placed on utilizing existing capabilities in USG agencies to train, resource, and enhance African stabilization efforts.

Davin O'Regan's presentation narrowed the discussion to a particular non-traditional threat by asking how to identify and manage transnational crime on the security-development spectrum. Given the extent of weak governance in much of Africa, transnational crime can easily be facilitated through corruption without recourse to violence. Transnational crime has penetrated many formal business, legal, security, and governance institutions in Africa, thus making the problem one which requires a robust response. A primary recommendation is that the international community should focus on enhancing the quality of governance within transnational organized crime host and transit countries through advisor assistance, training, and stronger relationships.

Participants and Objectives

In this panel Joseph Siegle, Director of Research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, presented his work on stabilizing development initiatives and processes. Davin O'Regan, also from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, presented on how to pinpoint and deal with transnational crime on the security-development spectrum. Jason Neal moderated the panel.

Panel Narrative

This panel addressed the issue of the roots of security and insecurity in Africa by examining two relationships: how stability enhances development, and how one particular security threat, transnational organized crime, undermines development.

Siegle argued that a critical question to consider is how a legitimate, effective, and accountable state can be built so that it delivers security and social services to its citizens and, thereby, maintains stability over time? Siegle analyzed how stability facilitates development processes. While poverty is a key factor of instability, there are

still relatively poor but peaceful nations in Africa, such as Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and Senegal. Thus, there is clearly more at stake in understanding why some but not all poor nations are prone to conflict. The interaction of governance and economics is one factor. Nations governed by autocratic leaders and characterized by low-income economies are several times more likely to become failed states. Siegle argued that the absence of a political outlet through which citizens can change their leaders has the effect of rationalizing violence as an alternative to autocratic governance. In addition, as the probability of conflict increases, per capita income decreases introducing a feedback mechanism.

Another aspect of many contemporary security challenges in Africa is that they tend to be geographically localized rather than national in scope; for example, the eastern DRC, northern Nigeria, and the Niger Delta all represent specific regions of geographic insecurity. There are often distinguishable features of these regions that put them at risk, such as ethnic cleavages, environmental issues, or resource abundance. States in Africa also have historical institutional barriers that contribute to these fundamental issues of instability, such as the fragility and dysfunction of state creation as initiated during the colonial era.

The multi-dimensional nature of state fragility demands the strengthening of integrated national and international stabilization strategies – bringing together political, development, and security actors – both official and non-governmental. He suggests there is already considerable experience that international actors can utilize to guide the development aspects of these stabilization efforts. What is most lacking for the implementation of effective stabilization strategies at this time are (1) the familiarity with and capacity on the part of African security sectors to implement a disciplined counter-insurgency campaign – and (2) adequate regional and international mechanisms to facilitate the integration of the various complementary components of these stabilization efforts. Accordingly, a reassessment of roles to be played to address the development aspects of the stability equation is unwarranted. Rather, greater focus should be given to understanding how to better integrate the roles, functional expertise, and experience that currently exists within the USG inter-agency to meet the respective multi-dimensional aspects of the stabilization challenge.

The second presenter Davin O'Regan, focused on the security and development challenges involved with Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). O'Regan delineated the nature of transnational organized crime in Africa, explaining its security and development dimensions on the continent, and how it manifests itself within different contexts. TOC is a compound threat with both security and development dimensions, requiring coordinated and complementary reforms and assistance in order to have more sustainable, positive, and sizable impacts.

Transnational organized crime includes illicit trafficking in arms, narcotics, people, counterfeit goods, and many licit goods and commodities but in ways that circumvent

taxes, customs, and various other regulations. Additionally, money laundering, extortion, financial fraud, producing counterfeit or illegally obtaining official documents, cyber crime, kidnapping, and other types of crimes not associated with illicit trafficking also often qualify. Such crime is “organized” in the sense that it typically is recurring and includes multiple perpetrators often performing specialized functions and tasks. Organized crime is “transnational” when goods cross borders, perpetrators are in more than one country, or its proceeds move between financial systems.

Given the extent of weak governance in much of Africa, transnational crime can be facilitated through corruption without recourse to violence. Indications of connections between high-level political figures in Ghana, Mozambique, Kenya, and South Africa suggest that traffickers and transnational criminals may have substantially penetrated politics and law making in many African countries. Clearly, transnational organized crime in Africa requires a robust response, yet such responses are complicated and sensitive given TOC’s security and development implications.

Though counter-TOC strategies and policies will vary, a critical feature of all efforts should be to enhance the quality of governance within TOC host and transit countries. One way to address TOC could be through a hybrid of the international community and national governments. The international community can bring in specialists to partner with lawyers, judges, and investigators, empowering workers on the ground and fragile institutions towards developing counter corruption programs. Depending on the scale and type of TOC prevalent in a given context, available entry points and priority institutions to support and assist will vary. Comprehensive counter-TOC strategies may often have to commence an intervention indirectly whether due to a lack of political will or available counterparts in the state apparatus. Ultimately, the most sustainable solution to address TOC in Africa will be more reliable, responsive, and legitimate institutions.

The discussion period focused on the relevance of economic makers as drivers of stability. The audience was curious why the presentations were so heavily focused on economics. The presenters suggested that economics are essential to security because it produces jobs and revenue. In addition, normal economic activity has a stabilizing influence on communities and serves as a facilitator of human security.

The next portion of the discussion concerned assisting governments that lack the capacity to handle TOC problems. A hybrid special court, such as the one used in Sierra Leone, was suggested as an ideal way for the international community to address TOC. However, special courts and various international interventions are only designed to step in when the problems become too large for national governments to handle. The assisted government must set up the agreement with the UN. However, it was suggested that a focus on countering TOC could be used as a starting point or model for other external assistance situations.

PANEL THREE: INTERSECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY PART II - IMPLICATIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES

The third panel offered three perspectives on how security and development are linked and how this linkage has developed the establishment and activities of AFRICOM. Clarence Bouchat discussed at least three options the U.S. military could use to move beyond its traditional security role and effectively apply soft power to help stabilize and develop Africa. The first option is for the military to concentrate on its current specialty, that is, focusing on a limited role in providing military—to—military assistance in the realms of security cooperation and host nation military assistance. The second option is for the U.S. military to lead the interagency effort in humanitarian and civil assistance as it has done in the past, but only in non-permissive environments where civilian actors have limited capability to operate with effect. The third option is for the military to engage in Nation Assistance or nation building such as security sector reform in which the military helps build capacity in the host nation's security forces.

Jan Bachmann's presentation analyzed the establishment and early evolution of U.S. Africa Command as representing a transformation in thinking regarding security and development. The post-Cold War realization that serious threats can emerge from ungoverned spaces in weak states solidified the connection between security and development into what Bachmann referred to as the security development nexus. AFRICOM's initial emphasis on interagency efforts and development projects reflected these shifts in approach.

In the third presentation, Andrea Talentino positioned AFRICOM's establishment within a broader trend that has also included changes in multilateral organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Within this trajectory, she identified several weaknesses in AFRICOM's approach to development. In her assessment, AFRICOM was pursuing a form of development that fulfilled certain formulaic markers of democracy, rather than building a system of government that creates effective states with active citizens who believe in democracy. Without long-term efforts to create mechanisms that connect citizens to government, efforts can ignore, marginalize, and neglect local actors and resources, and in the end contradict what the local population actually needs. Talentino argued that U.S. government policy is not coherent enough to allow AFRICOM to forge a comprehensive effort. She recommended that the U.S. government be more selective about which countries it partners with to ensure that they have the will and the capacity to make use of U.S. assistance.

Participants and Objectives

In this panel Clarence Bouchat, U.S. Army War College, presented research on the U.S. Military's interagency role in African development. Jan Bachman, University of Goteborg, Sweden, presented on the military's role in security and development

missions with AFRICOM. Andrea Talentino, Drew University, presented on the future of AFRICOM in development activities. Jason Neal moderated the panel.

Panel Narrative

The first presenter, Clarence Bouchat, presented his paper titled: “The U.S. Military’s Interagency Role in African Development: Lead, Support, or More of the Same?” In this paper and through his presentation, Bouchat argued that stability is dependent upon the mutually constitutive elements of security, governance, and development, however, each of these dimensions are best addressed by different actors. For example, the military is good at providing security and stability, but less so at promoting sustainable economic development or building systems of governance. While the military excels in providing hard power, it accepts soft power missions as sometimes necessary; yet other actors must be involved to provide true progress in the areas of governance and development. Ultimately, the keys to security and stability in Africa are effective governance and a strong economy.

Bouchat reviewed four options for the military as it pursues interagency approaches to promoting security in Africa. The first is to continue traditional military activities in the realm of Theater Security Cooperation. Security Assistance aims to leverage military to military contacts to professionalize partner nation militaries; this is especially useful in Africa, where militaries tend to need this type of assistance due to the tendency for regime preservation or overthrow. Methods to achieving security assistance include IMET (International Military Education and Training) provides education opportunities for individual officers, while the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program helps to upgrade the peacekeeping capabilities of African militaries by providing training light infantry and small unit tactics.

The second option for the military to fill its interagency role is to use Humanitarian and Civil Assistance, which is part of a combatant commander’s grand strategy of how to stabilize communities. This type of assistance is more along the lines of development, but since the military is limited by deployment schedules and short-term results as opposed to long-term maintenance and sustainment, logistical and qualitative problems arise.

The third approach the military can assume is to undertake Nation Assistance or nation building. According to Bouchat, Nation Assistance is as close to development as the DoD gets. A typical form of this type of assistance is Security Sector Reform, in which the DoD engages in a comprehensive effort to help develop and train a country’s security sector. Activities include training and equipping security forces, assisting with security force doctrine, and institution building.

The last option is for the U.S. military to support another agency’s lead. In this scenario, the military would provide funding, people and assets in support of programs initiated and led by other U.S. government agencies. Bouchat argued that USAID is the obvious

choice to be the lead implementing agency in a developmental approach to security, since USAID has long-term expertise in development that is internationally accepted. If USAID plans and directs the interagency effort, it would still require many of the organizational changes proposed under the military lead option. In addition, USAID would need to become a more robust organization, with improved planning abilities, training, and resource capabilities.

Bachmann presented a think piece that took a broader perspective on the role of AFRICOM in development and security. In “Laboratory AFRICOM: The Military’s Role in Security/Development Missions,” Bachman recalls the controversial narrative in 2007 and 2008 when AFRICOM was created. He argued that despite the debate and appearance of being a “new” kind of command, AFRICOM nevertheless constituted an institution that was a Cold War relic with more interest in resource and terrorism issues than African partners. Many critics were not convinced by the way that AFRICOM’s creators attempted to package and sell the organization, and felt the new rhetoric just obscured the true intent of the command. Also, there were fears from the Department of State and USAID regarding the emphasis on the new approach with a heavy civilian command. In response, AFRICOM stepped back from the lofty rhetoric, de-emphasized the new elements of the command and focused mainly on its traditional role (military to military activities).

Bachmann observed that since 2010, debates about AFRICOM had become increasingly depoliticized and restricted, no longer presenting the command as an opportunity to expand the mandate of the military and AFRICOM’s place in that mandate. This, Bachmann argued, had the effect of blurring the line between civilian and military activities. According to General Kip Ward, AFRICOM’s first commander, the discussion shifted from “why to implement AFRICOM?” to “why AFRICOM is the result of the post-Cold War transformation of security and development?”, reflecting new thinking from Europe, the UK, and Scandinavian countries that has created new responses, widened the understanding of security and development, and integrated civilian and military activities. A broadened role of the military is required for human security and development challenges where capacity building focuses on population protection, stabilization, and conflict prevention.

Security and stabilization are required due to the changing nature of the threat, characterized by global uncertainty and transnational conflict. This situation led to increasing attention on fragile states after the Cold War and ungoverned spaces after 9/11, which widened military activities into the development domain. Bachmann argued that the security-development nexus is undisputed wisdom since its vagueness, bridging character, and progressive and normative notions made it popular without challenging the traditional ideas of state security. However, the nexus entails increased responsibility and a moral obligation of the West to cover conflict prevention, counter-insurgency, reconstruction and state building, necessitating a whole of government or comprehensive approach.

Ultimately, Bachmann argued that AFRICOM embodied the predicaments of widening security and development and mobilized several boundary-crossing concepts, including a focus on the strengthening of state capacity. AFRICOM was the result of this wider debate and has made use of innovations as described in the counter-insurgency manual and put these ideas into practice. This includes ideas of active and sustained security and emphasis on interagency partnership. AFRICOM also inspired new thinking and discussions, particularly about how military geographic combatant commands should be structured in the future.

The third presenter, Talentino, began by stressing the importance of context, pointing out that security and development have been linked in academic literature for a long time. In “Making the Difference Real: AFRICOM and the Future of the Development Command,” she argued that the nineteenth century European powers in Africa had a different definition of development, one that focused on state security needs. Only in the last decade, has the UN shifted from focusing on macro indicators of development (state-level factors) to more micro-level factors, such as the impact of development on individuals and communities. The securitization of development was always there, she argued, and was not created by U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, or AFRICOM.

Talentino argued that the true shift that has occurred is the developmentization of *security*, rather than the securitization of development. Several changes over the last two decades exemplify this trend. She highlighted the fact that regional organizations such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) have recently incorporated references to and objectives defined around stability and development in their charters, arguing that development progress is necessary to ensure stable, conflict-free futures. We also see elements of this in the U.S. Army, as demonstrated by their most recent field manual, which added development explicitly as an Army activity.

When considering AFRICOM in particular, one key point is the concept of difference: it explicitly assumed a variety of development aspects. Talentino argued that after one takes into account the developmentalization of security, AFRICOM ultimately was not truly very different from a “traditional” combatant command. In her view, AFRICOM fit a trend that had been building in recent years, and was less radical than its original critics argued. AFRICOM was supposed to reflect a focus on capacity building rather than fighting, operationalizing the idea that focus should be on shoring up African states, facilitating abilities, and helping them help themselves.² AFRICOM was also supposed

² This posture changed after General Carter Ham assumed Command of AFRICOM in February 2011. In his first year at the command, General Ham de-emphasized development and capacity building, and instead focused the command on preparation to undertake kinetic operations (such as the Libya intervention) and more traditional theater security assistance.

to bring coherence to activities in Africa, gathering it all under one roof and attempting to integrate them.

If AFRICOM truly hoped to promote development for security, Talentino argued, it needed to look at the development that Africa needs. The concept of development is densely packed and involves a complex set of issues, yet the U.S. military often focused more on the trappings of the liberal democratic peace as promoting development. The goal is not only to bolster effective interactions but also to create mechanisms for citizens to be connected to them. The default has been to focus on markers and indicators rather than on building needed capabilities and thinking about how to establish capacity building programs. This emphasis on markers also neglects citizens as a resource. One of the problems of international efforts is that the international community has often ignored, marginalized or neglected local actors or saw them as the problem and at times contradicted what the local population wanted.

Talentino also argued that development required giving attention to social development, something rarely attempted in international programs by development agencies, let alone military actors. Lasting development must merge social programs with a comprehensive effort that creates the means of inclusion and provides access to the levers of power. This includes not only engagement, but also protection, which is crucial. People have to be secure to be engaged. This, finally, nuances the notion of what “security” is – individual rights, freedoms and capacities – rather than just state-centric notions. Security is both physical and broader than what is traditionally thought.

Talentino’s final point was that it is important for U.S. policy to be selective about who the country works with. A partner state needs to at least have the will to enact programs. As examples, she noted that training Liberian and Ghanaian military makes sense, while training the DRC military does not make as much sense, both because of the interest of the governments and the broader environment in each of these countries. In the DRC, the United States can train the military and have short-term success, but when the soldiers return to their units and don’t get paid, they will lose their training. The Liberian and Ghanaian governments are more supportive of the integrity of their militaries, and help their military personnel to internalize internationally-provided training. In the DRC there are also too many additional problems to make training effective.

PANEL FOUR: THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMUNITY

This panel focused on the role of Military Civil Affairs in reducing insecurity in Africa. Master Sergeant Brian McCartney from U.S. Africa Command presented lessons learned from his experience with Civil Affairs units in the Sahel. He argued that the expansion of the Civil Affairs mission has been perceived as an encroachment into what was once seen by many in the diplomatic and development communities as their exclusive roles. While questioned whether Civil Affairs is an appropriate role for the military, McCartney's presentation was based on the assumption that there is value in the military conducting civil affairs outside of the war zone. Anna Simons, from the Naval Postgraduate School Department of Defense Analysis, focused on what the role of military Civil Affairs community is and whether it should be conducting civil operations in a non-kinetic environment. She presented a case study of the Army Civil Affairs corps in the Philippines in 1954. Both presenters recognized limits of effectiveness based on mission scope and time constraints.

While McCartney focused on weaknesses in current planning, training, and execution, particularly in how regular and reserve corps trains prior to their mission, Dr. Simons took a wider and more critical view of the prospects of any involvement of Civil Affairs units in developing countries. McCartney proposed that there should be two distinct types of Civil Affairs corps, one with a longer and more comprehensive mission set by AFRICOM and a separate reserve corps that is trained for a different, more limited, mission set. Simon's suggested that the U. S. military should remove itself from capacity building altogether. Instead, military interaction should limit itself to efforts to professionalize foreign militaries and the promotion of foreign military sales programs. As she phrased it, "the U.S. should only aid those capable of helping themselves."

Participants and Objectives

In this panel Brian McCartney, US Africa Command, presented on lessons learned as a Civil Affairs corps member in Africa. Anna Simons, Naval Postgraduate School, presented a case study on civil affairs operations in the Philippines in 1954. Both discussed the roles of Civil Affairs within the framework of security building in Africa. Laura Perazzola moderated the panel.

Panel Narrative

Brian McCartney argues that the expansion of the civil affairs mission has been perceived as an encroachment into what was seen by many in the diplomatic and development communities as their exclusive roles. While some people question whether Civil Affairs (CA) is an appropriate role for the military, McCartney's presentation was based on the assumption that there is value in the military conducting

CA outside of the war zone. He suggests that this represents a necessary progression in DoD support towards foreign policy in order to meet US national security objectives.

In 2010, the U.S. deployed Civil Affairs teams are in ten countries in Africa.. McCartney argued that CA teams can produce positive results in stabilization and development, but only when utilized as part of a comprehensive strategy. When used as stand-alone programs, not complemented by activities of other U.S. government or non-governmental agencies, their impact is greatly diminished. He argued that CA teams are best utilized as expeditionary, initial entry tools in pursuit of national security objectives, which must then be followed by a larger development effort. Without the follow-on programs, the relationships that the CA teams have built are very likely to suffer.

McCartney echoed a common complaint of the developmental and NGO community when he argued that there is a point of diminishing returns where small scale activities can do more harm than good if they have not led to a larger U.S. effort to develop a given area. A comprehensive and productive approach therefore requires a unity of effort between the “three pillars”, not only in terms of executing activities, but also in terms of determining the long—term achievement of our national security strategy. That requires a great deal of closeness in interagency working relationships that U.S. actors have yet to achieve. While continual projects within the same region can build trust between local populations and the militaries (both domestic and international) over time, the Civil Affairs communities are ill suited, as currently deployed between active and reserve components, to make a lasting and strategic improvement. Additionally, they stand to do more harm than good if the gaps in coverage are not quickly identified and addressed.

One of the biggest problems McCartney outlined was the complexity of interagency organizational structures. Different departments have different risk tendencies, capabilities, time horizons, and rules and regulations. For example, while CA teams may desire to carry rifles for force protection, an Embassy official within DoS may only authorize concealable weapons in order to appear less aggressive to the host nation population. Yet the areas where CA teams desire to reach out to may be outside the protective range of DoS, thus necessitating greater force protection measures. Until embassies are able to accept high-risk engagement, CA teams cannot perform the types of missions they train for.

Anna Simons presented a working paper on the benefit of taking a hands-off approach to development assistance arguing that in most instances, development assistance increases corruption in the recipient country, thus undermining state sovereignty. Citing the example of Edward Landsdale’s success in the Philippines elections (circa 1954) as her reference case, she discussed the value of only offering assistance to countries that were capable of taking the initiative to improve their circumstances. Simons contended that the only beneficial role military could play in development is as trainers (to improve professionalization of foreign militaries) and to promote foreign

military sales, which would provide the United States with greater access to that nation. Civic Action needs to be a homegrown activity, perhaps supported by U.S., but it cannot be lead by an outside force. Because civil affairs was conceived as a component of a counterinsurgency strategy, it cannot be divorced from an overarching kinetic effort. Using civil affairs to create development will only perpetuate corruption and aid dependency, and is contrary to the true intent of CA. On her analysis, Simons recommended a comprehensive reduction in all military activities that attempt to pursue social, economic or other developmental goals outside of military capacity building.

PANEL FIVE: DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN EAST AFRICA

This panel focused on security and development aspects relevant to East Africa. Jessica Piombo, from the Naval Post Graduate School, presented on the civil affairs activities of the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). She outlined a number of anticipated and unanticipated effects of the ways that projects are carried out, and analyzed their likely impact both on development and security in the countries where these activities take place.

Maureen Farrell and Jessica Lee presented the initial findings of a study designed to measure the baseline of Civil Affairs projects conducted by the CJTF-HOA in Kenya. Farrell and Lee found that the projects have improved perceptions of the United States where they are conducted, contrary to popular criticisms. Farrell and Lee also presented their research as a model of how qualitative assessments can help to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. military activities.

Brendan Sullivan and Rebecca Mason, both working at the NGO *Educate! (Uganda)*, presented a paper on the security environment from the perspective of a Non-Governmental Organization operating in Uganda and focused on the effectiveness of Military-NGO liaison in Somalia and Uganda. Traditional notions of security based upon upholding the rationale of state borders do not hold sway over transnational groups operating in postcolonial realities of the developing world, where “the nation-state has unnaturally superseded the national state.”

In all presentations, the relationship between security and development is highlighted as being most effective when coordinated, repeated, and measured. The open discussion that followed the presentations focused on how the perception of the U.S. can be influenced by being culturally and historically aware of the conditions that predicated involvement of a coordinating authority (such as AFRICOM or the CJTF-HOA) to ensure consolidated effort.

Participants and Objectives

In this panel Jessica Piombo, Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, presented a teaching case study entitled, “Military Provision of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: A Day in the Life of a Civil Affairs Team in the Horn of Africa.”³ Maureen Farrell and Jessica Lee, U.S. Africa Command, co-presented research undertaken for the Social Science Research Center through a Socio-Cultural Analysis Team (SCRAT). Their research focused on how human security projects affect local communities and advance U.S. government objectives. Rebecca Mason and Brendan Sullivan, co-presented on the relationship between poverty and conflict in Somalia and Uganda. Gustav Jordt moderated the panel.

³ National Defense University, Center for Complex Operations Case Study Number 5, May 2010.

Panel Narrative

Piombo presented a case study of the U.S. military's provision of humanitarian and civic assistance in the Horn of Africa based on field research in East Africa conducted in 2007 and 2008, and follow-on interviews at AFRICOM in 2009 and 2010. When the Marines established Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti in 2002, it was meant to be a short-term mission to capture terrorists. In 2006, the U.S. Navy took over the mission and shifted the emphasis to reconstruction and stabilization in over nine countries in eastern Africa, while the primary mission remained counterterrorism. The CJTF-HOA sent Civil Affairs teams, typically comprised of five to eight people each, to conduct development projects that were quick impact, low-cost, which the teams could complete on the spot as well as longer-term special projects. Blending the security and development orientation of the task force, the CA teams conducted these projects primarily in areas thought to be vulnerable to terrorism.

Piombo illustrated the complexity of implementing successful development projects in CJTF-HOA. There were a number of bureaucratic hurdles that the teams had to work through in order to see a project from start to finish. In order to circumvent the approvals process for official humanitarian assistance projects, she found that teams tended to instead focus their efforts on small projects that they could execute using the CJTF-HOA's operating funds. These "minimal expenditure" were at that time less constrained by bureaucratic hurdles, as the CA teams did not need to seek embassy or COCOM approval for them (this has changed since 2011). These projects were small, most of the time costing under \$2500, and had to be quick impact, unplanned engagements. However, these types of low-end projects were not what Civil Affairs teams were meant to focus on. Instead, they were supposed to spend most of their time planning projects that would have a higher-order strategic impact can better support the overall mission of CJTF-HOA. The tension between focusing on minimal expenditure projects, which were quick impact and locally owned, versus the larger official HA projects, which were better coordinated with other USG agencies but took at least six months to complete, illustrated many of the complex tensions created in military engagements that spanned the development-security divide. .

Farrell and Lee co-presented on civil military operations in the East and Horn of Africa and how the socio-cultural effects of these operations can contribute to the implementation of the U.S. government's foreign policy in those regions. Their study was based on field research in three areas of eastern Africa, the North Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces in Kenya, as well as Tanga in coastal Tanzania. Echoing one of the workshop's most occurring themes, they noted that their research revealed that the "whole of government approach" was often made difficult by synchronization problems that developed from differences within institutional cultures. These manifested in many ways, ranging from the simple use of language (e.g. "schedule" versus "battle rhythm"), to the application of complex problem solving strategies. They reviewed additional tensions in the "3D" approach, noting that since Civil Affairs teams fall under the

authority of the Ambassador, the relationship between DoD and other agencies can be mutually reinforcing or quite tense. Relationships tend to work best when the DoD is seen as the third (and least important) “D” in the 3D metric. Farrell and Lee witnessed mutually-reinforcing relationships between Embassy Country Teams and MCAT in Tanzania, however in Kenya the relationship was less conducive to advancing U.S. policy.

Finally, Farrell and Lee argued that the U.S. military should assess its programs through more than just quantitative methods that count inputs. They can also conduct qualitative assessments that enable fine-grained analysis of both the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. military activities, particularly focusing on outcomes. In some instances, the U.S. military did an excellent job coordinating with host nation counterparts, in other instances, the military came up short in fully communicating and coordinating efforts with partners. In addition, synergy among agencies will contribute to greater effectiveness. Shortfalls in 3D coordination can lead to problems with strategic communication efforts, missed opportunities to synch with other USG programs, and failure to identify key identity groups to partner with. Finally, the U.S. military has a distinct military purpose behind its human security projects that should be kept in mind.

The third group of presenters, Mason and Sullivan, presented a paper that posited the centrality of human security as an essential component of protecting vulnerable populations in Africa subject to the dangers of transnational entities. Traditional notions of security based upon upholding the rationale of state borders do not hold sway over transnational groups operating in postcolonial realities of the developing world, where “the nation-state has unnaturally superseded the national state.” The authors studied the cases of Somalia and Uganda, arguing that the US military should move away from a traditional security based policy, and instead concentrate on moving funds and focus to more direct government and non-government sponsored humanitarian assistance programs. The security and development climate in East Africa should be viewed as a regional issue, not a national issue based upon ineffective borders. The authors compared developmental failures in Somalia against successes in Uganda, and suggested that Uganda’s developmental success and relative move to peace over the past quarter-century can be best explained through the structural influence international organizations have had on policy and program development. Uganda and the international community have been successful with an aid-led reform agenda because of a significant investment in monitoring and evaluation, attention to structural reform, and an absence of conflict over these reforms due to a domestic consensus for liberalization. Mason and Sullivan suggest the US use a similar structural reform program in Somalia.

The common thread to this panel was the overall effectiveness of individual civil and military projects. While most accomplish tactical objectives defined by the scope of the exercise, civil affairs project, or inter-agency activity, the danger exists in that strategically, organizations achieve very little if done ad-hoc. The systems of accounting

identified by Piombo and echoed by Farrell & Lee seemed to be lacking in overall usefulness, though projects like those undertaken by the Socio-Cultural Research and Analysis Teams are movements in the correct direction. Since the research of these three, some changes have been put in place to make minimal expenditure projects more regulated, while the overall development focus of the CJTF-HOA has diminished somewhat. Lee and Farrell's work will help to establish a baseline against which to measure strategic progress in years to come. Additionally, the link between development and security is not isolated to coordination between interagency forces. Mason and Sullivan illustrate that coordination between NGOs and other countries' missions is also crucial to achieving progress in African countries. Although challenging, there is benefit to engaging entities outside the U.S. interagency to gather data and link security to development.

PANEL SIX: MARITIME SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN PARTNERSHIP STATION

Panel Six was focused upon maritime security and threat mitigation in Western Africa, with a specific case study of U.S. engagements in Ghana and the African Partnership Station (APS). Each of these blends security assistance with more developmental programs, aimed to increase the African nations' responses to their own security threats.

Alison Rimsky Vernon and Margaux Daly first presented the results of their research on U.S. engagements with the Ghanaian security forces to enhance maritime security. They noted that a common shortfall in the U.S. approach is the way the initiate discussions with the Ghanaians, and that U.S. actors had more success in generating quality discussions and programs when they attempted to move beyond a U.S.-centric focus. The authors recommended the USN focus on establishing maritime security generally, and focus on specific types of objectives and activities to accomplish this. They argued that framing the discussion in a way that focuses on Ghanaian concerns would be far more constructive for the United States. They recommended that the USN focus efforts on 1) establishing general maritime security in Ghana, rather than on mitigating specific maritime threats, and 2) facilitate relationships within Ghana and between Ghana and its regional partners and advocate for the Ghanaian Navy as a priority for resourcing. They also noted that the U.S. military actors should more consciously engage actors and inputs outside of the security sector to truly achieve sustainable partner nation security. The key is to identify important inputs and then, often in close coordination with other agencies and organizations, address them in a way that will influence vital behaviors. By doing so, the United States would stand a much greater chance of attaining the cooperative security it seeks.

Following the group presentation, Daly spoke about her research on the Africa Partnership Station (APS), a multinational maritime engagement coordinated out of U.S. Naval Forces Africa in Naples. She found that the activities performed by the U.S. military in these missions were tactically successful, but as they are conducted they are not sufficient to achieve long-term strategic objectives in terms of developing partner capacity in African countries or in reducing threats to the maritime sector in Africa. This limitation results, in part, from a misunderstanding of what key inputs and players are important in achieving lasting maritime safety and security goals. In her case, the APS engagement mission failed to recognize the key role partner nation capability plays in creating lasting change, and to substantially engage with the primary actors driving this change: the host nation governments. Daly argued that we can use the APS example and the difficulties the mission experienced in achieving its strategic objectives, to: 1) develop a general model of what is required to achieve objectives, 2) see where the inaugural APS mission fell short, and 3) determine how future missions can be designed to improve the likelihood of success.

Participants and Objectives

In this panel Alison Rimsky Vernon, Margaux Daly, and Veronica de Allende, Center for Naval Analysis, co-presented on maritime threats in Ghana and what role the US and its African Partnership Station can play in mitigating those threats. Margaux Daly then presented on achieving cooperative security goals through the APS. Jason Neal moderated the panel.

Panel Narrative

The first maritime threat examined by the authors was piracy and U.S. efforts to help the Ghanaian government to combat piracy. The presenters reviewed three sets of maritime security threats, and noted that U.S. and Ghanaian prioritization of these varied widely. While piracy in Ghana is generally not a significant threat, consisting of only five percent of all maritime threats in sub-Saharan Africa from 2005-2009, there is a spillover threat from Nigeria because pirates have fled from Nigeria to Ghana in recent years. In addition, there are energy security threats related to piracy in the region, particularly related to the oil sector within Ghana and threats stemming from oil bunkering and illegal trafficking in Nigeria. A second threat to Ghana is trafficking, including cocaine from South America to Europe; oil from Nigeria to the world; cigarettes from Europe and Asia to West and North Africa; counterfeit medicines from Asia to West Africa; victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation from West Africa to Europe; small arms to West Africa; and toxic waste from Europe to Nigeria and Ghana. While trafficking was a major concern for the U.S. embassy in Ghana, it was not a priority for the Ghanaian government. Finally, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing can threaten fisheries-based economies and livelihoods. It includes activities such as unlicensed fishing/poaching, fishing with illegal gear, going over established quotas for fish, or fishing outside of defined seasons, and misreporting or failing to report catch data. Similar to narco-trafficking, U.S. and Ghanaian officials perceive and prioritize IUU fishing quite differently; with the United States prioritizing the challenges more highly than the Ghanaian government (while the Ghanaians affected obviously prioritize the problem much more highly than their own government).

The presenters noted that although Ghana has taken some steps to address its maritime threats, these have not been sufficient to meet the challenges. The reasons for Ghana's failure to substantially adopt mitigation behaviors include some major constraints: lack of awareness, lack of resources, and corruption. There was also a significant problem with political will: some of the most influential stakeholders who could influence Ghanaian security activities - the President, Parliament, Judiciary and Ministry of Finance - had little interest in the maritime sector. Those who did attempt to promote maritime security were the Minister of Defence and oil companies, which had the potential to be influential, but achieved little success in their efforts. The wider issue public for maritime security, had much less influence - the Ghanaian Navy, fisheries, ports authorities, the police.

Because of the differences in how the two governments prioritize specific maritime threats, the presenters argued that the USN, and the U.S. embassy in general, would find more success if they re-oriented their efforts to discuss establishing maritime security generally, and focus on specific types of objectives and activities to accomplish this. Framing the discussion in such a way that focuses on Ghanaian concerns will be far more constructive for the United States. Given that U.S. and Ghana priorities vary and that resources are not unlimited, they recommended that USN efforts focus on increasing general maritime security behaviors in Ghana that can prevent and mitigate multiple threats simultaneously. They recommended that the USN also help mentor the Ghanaian Navy on how to better lobby for resources within the Ministry of Defense and, if possible, to lobby for resources from the Finance Ministry.

Margaux Daly then offered an analysis of the APS based on her time spent with the flagships over several years. The Africa Partnership Station (APS) is the institution focused on engagement in West and East Africa from U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (USNAFAF). Since its inception in 2007, APS has been focused on creating a safe and secure maritime environment in Africa; moreover, the focus has been on helping coastal countries to secure the maritime environment themselves, rather than relying on outside help. Long-term regional relationship building was a critical aspect of this program. The APS sought to offer a forum to establish and inculcate relationships among the various countries.

Daly found that the activities performed by the U.S. military in these missions were tactically successful in terms of individual training, but as conducted they were insufficient to achieve larger-order strategic objectives. This limitation results, in part, from a misunderstanding of what key inputs and players are important in achieving lasting maritime safety and security goals. Namely, the APS engagement mission failed to recognize the key role partner nation capability plays in creating lasting change, and to substantially engage with the primary actors driving this change: the host nation governments.

One of the reasons for this neglect of capacity building and host nation engagement, Daly argued, was from the ways that U.S. personnel viewed these non-combat operations. Daly observed that among the APS staff, some personnel felt that peacetime missions were “lesser-included” operations that did not require specific training to execute. She noted, however, that although engagement missions may not require the level of tactical and technical skill required to fight and win major combat, engagement missions can be more complicated to achieve than those of combat operations. Goals can be difficult to define; there often is no “adversary” to combat and therefore it is difficult for the military to identify “targets” for effects; and the link between engagement activities and the accomplishment of desired goals is complex and not straightforward.

Overall, the APS was more successful in achieving its tactical goal of training partner nation maritime forces and in paving the way for future engagement with these nations. However, its strategic success was limited, because the APS failed to assist nations to increase overall activities in the realm of maritime safety and security in any substantive way. APS planners failed to effectively engage a key set of actors (the government) and did not appreciate that trained and motivated maritime forces alone are not sufficient to achieve maritime security. Daly noted that since its inaugural mission in 2007, the APS staff had broadened their efforts to engage a more diverse set of stakeholders in the planning and execution of the effort.

A primary finding from the panel was that host nation governments were a necessary target actor that need to be influenced to produce resourcing behaviors, and ultimately, to achieve cooperative security objectives. This was an insight that was hard-learned for the military actors, but, as noted by the civilians in the audience, one that development experts have known for decades. Here, the discussions hit on one of the most long-standing tensions in U.S. military activities that seek to produce developmental ends (such as capacity building and strategic planning). Military personnel often do not understand the political aspects behind partner nation programs and policies, nor do they often appreciate the variety of actors that they need to engage with when conducting non-kinetic missions. The APS staffs have learned over time to engage more broadly, but the presenters noted that a closer interagency effort from the beginning of the APS program could have prevented the need to learn these lessons the hard way.

Furthermore, to achieve the objective of long-term, sustainable security, behavioral change may be required in two separate sets of partner nation actors: the partner nation's security forces, and the partner nation's leadership, who are responsible for creating and sustaining these forces. Daly in particular suggested that actors and inputs outside of security force ability must be more consciously engaged to have any chance of influencing and achieving sustainable partner nation security. The key is to identify important inputs and then, often in close coordination with other agencies and organizations, address them in a way that will influence vital behaviors. By doing so, the United States will stand a much greater chance of attaining the cooperative security it seeks.

PANEL SEVEN: INTERACTIONS IN THE FIELD

This panel explored communication and relationships between organizations operating in the field. The overall theme was that more attention focused on building strong relationships interagency relationships will provide better results in the field. Groups with similar mission sets often fail to create synergy in their activities, organizations, or goals. Some presenters felt that AFRICOM could serve as a central hub for facilitating relationship building.

The first presenter, Richard Byess, explored some of the issues that challenge the civil-military relationship; outlined the feasibility of an integrated civilian-military approach to security and development; addressed the limitations or challenges of an integrated approach; and made recommendations for overcoming these limitations. He focused on the miscommunication dilemma created when different agencies have divergent definitions of and assumptions about issues such as security and humanitarian development. In addition to the communication gaps, he emphasized coordination challenges created by cultural and organizational diversity between organizations, particularly USAID and the U.S. military.

G. William Anderson also focused on communication problems. Along with having difficulties speaking the same language, agencies need to actually open the lines of communication between each other. He addressed the misperceptions that exist in regards to organizational capabilities and programs between USAID and the DoD. He also discussed the differences each organization has for planning. Anderson argued that a process like security sector reform, for example, involves more than just building a functional military, it requires the construction of foundational institutions that are necessary in order for a military to be successful. He argued that two of the principal challenges facing the US Government in Africa are (1) achieving sustained post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization and (2) developing more effective approaches and institutions for conflict and crisis prevention. These challenges require greater cooperation among partner agencies within the US government.

The final presenters were Teresa Crawford from Partners for Democratic Change and Trina Zwicker, from AFRICOM. They presented a co-authored paper on why AFRICOM needs an NGO outreach strategy, and emphasized that such a strategy was necessary because Africa Command was interacting with a wide variety of civilian organizations at a variety of levels and on a diverse number of issues. They recommended that command staff work with the DoD to fix the structural issues that limit their interaction with NGOs. Improving structural conditions could include: articulation of a clear strategy; deepened understanding of NGOs; broadened outreach to additional NGOs; and improved information sharing between headquarters and field / in-country staff.

Participants and Objectives

In this panel Richard Byess and Gene Bonaventure, United States Agency for International Development co-presented on achieving stability and development in AFRICOM. G. William Anderson, Virginia Tech University, presented on how USAID and DoD can work together more effectively in Africa. Teresa Crawford and Trina Zwicker, Partners for Democratic Change in AFRICOM, presented on why AFRICOM needs an NGO outreach strategy. Gustav Jordt moderated the panel.

Panel Narrative

The first presenter, Richard Byess explored some of the issues that challenge the civil-military relationship; outlined the feasibility of an integrated civilian-military approach to security and development; addressed the limitations or challenges of an integrated approach; and finally offered some suggestions for overcoming these limitations.

Byess suggested that dialogue is key to achieving stability. He began by asking the workshop participants to define security. The group realized there was not a single definition that could be agreed upon amongst them, even though all were experts in both development and security. Byess emphasized that language and context of words obscured the security-development nexus. Stabilization, he suggested, is an ambiguous term with no concrete definition. Similarly, what is a "humanitarian" effort? To USAID and the developmental community, humanitarian action is not building a school, as many military personnel define humanitarian operations. Instead, non-military actors define humanitarian efforts as emergency initiatives to save lives. He suggested that calling everything humanitarian leads to misuse of the term. His bottom line assessment is that agencies need to come to a common understanding of terms and use them appropriately.

Byess suggested that organizations need to know their "customers" in order to be effective. More joint planning should be done; for example USAID should be involved in the development of DoD theater objectives so that they understand what the Pentagon is doing. He suggested that if the U.S. government is going to be serious about Africa, then we need to be serious about intent, objectives, and measures of effectiveness. Better representatives—from DoD to country teams—are needed that have an idea what interagency relations consist of.

The next presenter was Bill Anderson focusing on how USAID and the DoD can work together more effectively. He argued that in Africa, two of the principal challenges facing the US Government were (1) achieving sustained post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization and (2) developing more effective approaches and institutions for conflict and crisis prevention. These challenges required greater cooperation among partner agencies within the US government than occurred. He explored the overall question of how USAID and DoD can work together more effectively in Africa to strengthen weak and fragile states and prevent or mitigate conflict. He discussed a series of key questions

concerning opportunities, risks, and obstacles, and lessons learned about USAID-DoD collaboration in Africa, focusing principally on USAID-DoD relationships at the COCOM level (AFRICOM) and country team levels.

Anderson noted that calls for interagency cooperation have created a perception that foreign assistance is being militarized. Lack of coordination with missions in the field leaves many NGOs worried about how the military presence threatens them. Anderson emphasized that civilian agencies must do their part to build strong accountable institutions, so that militarization cannot occur. Within this discussion, Anderson noted that Congress' failure to commit to rebuilding USG civilian capabilities was a key constraint in creating the true interagency coordination that is necessary to address development and security in Africa.

Anderson then presented some possibilities for creating opportunities for interagency integration and cooperation. He suggested that a secure and stable environment is critical for success and then offered some important questions to consider: Can the DoD succeed in building a professional military in Africa? Can DoD build institutions from scratch? What is the systematic approach?

The next presenters were Crawford and Zwicker. The two first worked together as AFRICA Command attempted to build a comprehensive approach towards sustainable development that built on the unique relationships between military and development NGOs. Their paper focused on the civil / military interactions between staff and offices at AFRICOM.

Zwicker gave a brief overview of AFRICOM's mission and outreach efforts that fell under AFRICOM's Outreach Directorate, which was at the time split into two divisions: strategic communications and partnership. The outreach program was tasked with expanding relationships between military and NGOs as well as addressing challenges that arose in the field and within bureaucracies. One of the largest challenges for them was trying to reconcile the interaction and communication gap between military forces and NGOs. Groups with similar mission sets often failed to create synergy in their activities, organizations, or goals. Levels of engagement existed along strategic, humanitarian, planning, tactical program implementation, and information / outreach, and Zwicker suggested that Africa Command could serve as a lead, co-convenor with others, or a participant in each of these arenas.

The presenters suggested there were many questions left remaining as Africa Command endeavors to build a more cohesive approach. These questions include: 1) are there particular sectors where Africa Command could focus their NGO outreach efforts? 2) What improvements or innovations would make it easier to coordinate with NGOs and across communities in countries where Africa Command is working? 3) What could other U.S. agencies do to improve the perception of Africa command among NGOs? 4) What concerns do African NGOs have about Africa Command? Are some NGOs more

open than others to working with the military? 5) Given the current constraints on Africa Command/NGO interaction, would it be better for Africa Command to focus on improving the work they are currently doing with certain NGOs rather than expanding the engagement to a wider NGO community?

Overall, the presenters conclude that Africa Command is interacting with civilian organizations to include NGOs, at a variety of levels and on a diverse number of issues. They recommend that command staff work with the DoD to fix the structural issues that limit their interaction with NGOs. Improving structural conditions could include: articulation of a clear strategy; deepened understanding of NGOs; broadened outreach to additional NGOs; and improved information sharing between headquarters and field / in-country staff.

PANEL EIGHT – SECURITY SECTOR SUPPORT AND CAPACITY BUILDING

This panel examined security sector reform as a microcosm of development and security. The panelists all embraced an expansive conception of security, looking beyond states and military institutions. Security sector reform not only requires internal capacity building from a “bottom-up” perspective, but also external support through resource acquisition, training, and advice on design. All the panelists emphasized that relying upon traditional notions of security in Africa may serve to undermine security sector reform if governmental institutions are weak, corrupt, or non-existent as evidenced in conflict zones such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A reconceptualization of security at the human level can move past problems rooted in bad governance, uneven development, exclusion, and rights abuses at the state level. However, panelists noted that it is often difficult for military actors to embrace and operationalize programs that help to enhance human, rather than state security.

Despite this, AFRICOM has come to take on both traditional and human security roles. The focus on human security, panelists noted, directed attention to the imbalance between civilian and military resources that created a gap between policy objectives and outcomes. This imbalance has necessitated an expansion of the military’s jurisdiction into traditionally and internationally accepted civilian realms, which has spawned most of the recent debate on the creeping militarization of US foreign policy.

Participants and Objectives

In this panel Dustin Sharp, University of San Diego, presented on accountability and impunity in West Africa. Andrea M. Walther, Development Alternatives Incorporated, presented on the role of AFRICOM in security sector reform. Cliff Keller, US Army Special Operations Command Headquarters, presented on building grassroots sovereignty in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Laura Perazzola moderated the panel.

Panel Narrative

Sharp argued that in many African countries the security sector itself—those actors and institutions with the central charge of providing defense and security—have too often become a persistent source of insecurity through acts of corruption, extortion, criminality, and various human rights abuses. When such abuses are allowed to go unchecked over time, protectors become predators, operating in some instances with near total impunity. Without accountability for corruption and human rights abuses, the rule of law is undermined, and the prospects for advancing development and security are diminished. Given this, security sector “reform” programs that focus on building the capacity of security forces will only create more problems if they are not embedded in larger-order governance programs. Therefore, when addressing the security-development nexus in West Africa today, international actors must include greater

efforts to close this accountability gap in the traditional security sector. Far from being peripheral to the security-development nexus, issues of accountability and impunity for human rights abuses must be brought to the center of thinking and programming in areas of peace operations, development, and security and justice sector reform.

Sharp continued by suggesting that given the complexity and diversity of the security threats present in West Africa, it would be naïve to assume a military or traditional security solution. This is the crux of the development-security nexus when viewed through the lens of security sector reform programs. Examples from the Niger delta and elsewhere suggest that security problems rooted in bad governance, uneven development, exclusion, and rights abuses require a comprehensive package of reforms and interventions. Where there is no political will to pursue justice for human rights abuses, and where security forces are complicit or themselves perpetrators, impunity sets in.

Given this, a paradigm shift from traditional to human security at the policy level could help to (re)conceptualize problems of accountability and impunity by traditional security sector actors in two ways. First, by taking a holistic and people-centered approach to security, focused on the needs of the individual and not just the state, the human security lens helps us to see abuses by security forces as among those dire security threats, which must be addressed in order for overall security to be advanced. In addressing these threats to individuals, state security will ultimately be strengthened insofar as mechanisms and institutions that foster accountability are reinforced. Second, a re-orientation of traditional West African security forces to better enable them to address a fuller range of human security issues, as opposed to just regime security, could itself help to improve the broader human rights picture in West Africa today by refocusing security actors on the proper beneficiaries of the security they are supposed to provide. This initiative includes a focus on “bottom-up” citizen-led initiatives to pressure local governments and security sector institutions for accountability and reform.

The next presenter, Andrea Walther, analyzed security sector reform (SSR) in Africa and the role and consequences of US Africa Command in the SSR process. Based on her work with the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership, Walther argued that while some tangible steps have been taken to advance overall US SSR efforts, they still lack a comprehensive and coordinated government effort. Echoing points raised by several other participants, she noted that the obvious imbalance that exists between civilian and military resources has created a gap between policy objectives and programmatic application of societal transformation. One leg of the US security sector assistance triad (DoD-USAID-DoS) is much more prominent than the others as DoD resources dramatically outweigh that of DoS and USAID. This imbalance has necessitated an expansion of the military’s jurisdiction into traditionally and internationally accepted civilian realms, which has spawned most of the recent debate on the creeping militarization of US foreign policy.

The third presenter, Keller, proposed an organizational and operational model for how Special Operations Forces could assist in improving both security and development in failed states and under-governed spaces, with a particular focus on the DRC. His paper described how social capital and national civic identity could be built, or rebuilt, through prudent development of partner nation SOF capabilities, rather than through direct U.S. military involvement. It described what that partner nation SOF force would look like, and what it would be configured to do. He focused on the DRC, but concluded with a discussion of how his proposed model could be adapted to other states and under-governed areas in Africa.

Keller argued that greater effectiveness in building partner nation capacity (whether for counterinsurgency or development projects) can be achieved by reducing direct U.S. involvement and increasing U.S. advisory (not training) activities focused on teaching the partner nation to teach themselves. He concentrates on how such forces would be configured, trained, and advised in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since it represents a particularly challenging test case. It is so large and broken that no current “whole-of-government” approach could possibly work. (Here, he interestingly contradicted the sentiments of several participants who had argued that a whole of government approach is necessary in a situation like the DRC because creating security forces without government institutions to control them would create more problems.) Instead, it begs a significantly different design, but one that could potentially be adopted in other failed states.

Keller proposed a model in which African governments would be helped to build a corps of small, networked, self-sufficient Operational Groups as the core of the special operations forces. This distributed model would be appropriated for countries like the DRC where there is very little functional central infrastructure. Keller argued that SOF could actually help generate the human and social capital that would facilitate the spread of other government functions. By focusing on establishing the functions of governance instead of the bureaucracy of government, this program would enhance the responsiveness and legitimacy of the partner nation. The development programs of the partner nation SOF must be based on an analysis of local requirements and not on the preferences of the Operational Groups. If the projects are not relevant to local conditions, and not locally sustainable, then even the most “productive” partner nation SOF will fail to expand good governance and sovereignty. At the same time, simply assessing needs accurately is not sufficient. The partner nation SOF has to be organized in such a way as to assist locals to address them. Sustainability, it was argued, cannot be accomplished in any other way.

PANEL NINE: HEALTH PROGRAMS

The ninth and last panel focused on the differences between interagency relationships and cooperation that impede upon the development of health programs in Africa. As the DoD increased its involvement in complex development or development-like activities, military involvement in medical engagements rose as well.

As noted in previous panels, these presenters discussed how the relationship between the military and NGOs is a point of contention due to different capabilities and the assumptions that these organizations make about each other. Each type of organization has different methods in which to perform medical engagements and both NGOs and the military have assumptions about the other organization, which impedes cooperation. Despite the challenges, however, each of the presenters were able to identify instances of cooperation and the cooperation of multiple agencies to achieve medical assistance. By understanding the limitations and strengths of each organization, more can be achieved in terms of medical engagements. The military does have more flexibility in its operations and can turn around money faster than USAID. The military can be used to fill the gaps where NGOs and DoS are unable, whether due to funding issues or security. DoS and USAID programs need to be more flexible in order to address crises quickly. All organizations need to understand the other organizations and use each other's strengths to achieve a common goal.

Another major theme of the panel was the ability to understand each agency's culture. One panelist focused on the Pandemic Response Program (PRP), a DoD program, that was designed like a USAID program. By structuring the program in a way that USAID could easily interact with, AFRICOM's planners made funding and cooperation amongst the agencies easier to achieve.

Finally, panelists reviewed some options for how the military can serve as a gap filler where (for various reasons) NGOs or DoS cannot function. A number of recommendations were offered: "coordinate but differentiate" between organizations with each undertaking complementary duties; establish a coordinating body to serve as an intermediary; streamline USG funding for health assistance; and develop clear policy roles for agencies working on health programs. This panel concluded by trying to focus on each individual agency's strength and using that to fill gaps in weakness.

Participants and Objectives

In this panel Diana B. Putman, United States Africa Command, presented on implementing quasi-developmental programs in Africa. Marla Haims, Gene Bonaventure and C. Ross Anthony, RAND Corporation, co-presented on the relationship between DoD and NGOs in complex development and how to enhance the effectiveness of US government health assistance. Gustav Jordt moderated the panel.

Panel Narrative

Haims, Bonaventure, and Anthony presented on the complex relationships between DoD and NGOs operating in fragile, failed, or post-conflict states. The presenters first introduced what complex development is and how it differs from humanitarian relief or disaster response efforts. They argued that “development” should be defined activities that deliver or enhance the local capacity to deliver essential services in fragile, failed, or post conflict states (otherwise referred to as complex development) crippled by some combination of extreme poverty, insecurity and weak government.

Working with this definition, the Department of Defense has scaled up complex development activities. With the potential confusion among locals on the ground, along with overall different skill sets, cultures, missions, goals, and methods, it is not surprising that the DoD and NGOs have found forging a cooperative relationship difficult. Yet such civilian-military relationships are critical for pursuing a U.S. foreign policy that carefully balances defense, development, and diplomacy.

The presenters argued that the DoD can play a unique role in filling a gap that NGOs cannot meet due to security situations or resource shortfalls. The Rand study looked at two separate complex environments— post-conflict reconstruction (typically a non-permissive, or insecure environment) and pure counterinsurgency/counterterrorism (typically a more permissive, or secure environment). In it, the authors examined perceived and actual barriers contributing to the tension between the groups; gleaned insights from instances of good coordination; and offered a feasible, preliminary set of recommendations for improved U.S. government effectiveness in health assistance through more effective NGO-DoD relationships.

The authors focused on the following lessons learned.

1) DoD and NGOs conducted similar activities in shared space, but had different objectives. On one side the DoD viewed development as a means to an end—to gain access, influence, and information from a host nation. On the other side, NGOs sought to reduce suffering, transition to development, and build capacity. Moreover NGOs provided longer-term fundamental assistance, whereas DoD provided short-term instrumental assistance.

2) The DoD’s health assistance activities were difficult to quantify and qualify. The lack of clarity to Medical Stability Operations and the limited dedicated health assistance programs the DoD offers showcased a general lack of strategic objectives for health assistance and related policies and programs from the DoD.

3) Different organizational traits and cultures created challenges (by this point in the workshop, a much-raised point). The different organizational cultures of DoD and

NGOs—the former being hierarchical and the latter being loosely structured—presents coordination challenges in shared spaces. The DoD did not organize, train or equip solely for development missions. Moreover, within the DoD staff turnover rapidly inhibited relationship building, while propensity for risk prevented many DoD elements from living off bases, thus separating them from the locals.

4) Several assumptions impeded the DoD-NGO relationship. Among DoD officials, one assumption was that security cannot be accomplished without engaging in development activities. Another was that quick impact projects would win hearts and minds among locals. A third was that NGOs were generally the same—disorganized, slow and ineffective. Among NGOs, the assumptions included: if they were associated with the military they would become targets; NGO association with the military will jeopardize independence and trust which could impede the mission; and that the military lacked the knowledge, expertise, and proper orientation to perform development activities well.

The presenters provided a number of recommendations:

- 1) the USG should clearly define policies and agency roles for health assistance;
- 2) the United States should streamline USG funding for health assistance;
- 3) there is a need to establish a coordinating body to function as an intermediary between DoD and NGOs;
- 4) the DoD and NGOs should “coordinate but differentiate;”
- 5) the DoD should consider organizational changes to better support USG health assistance; and
- 6) both the DoD and NGOs should institute related training and education requirements.

The next presenter was Diana Putman, a senior USAID official who had headed the Humanitarian Assistance branch at AFRICOM for several years (following her assignment at AFRICOM, Putman became the head of USAID in the DRC). Putman argued that while many of AFRICOM's programs have been successful, there remain many challenges as the command endeavored to integrate its non-DoD members into its plans and operations. These included differences in organizational cultures and planning processes. Putman suggested additional steps to improve interagency integration within the Command.

She reviewed one program that had achieved remarkable success in promoting coordination between the DoD and USAID: The Partner Military HIV/AIDS Program, or PMHAP. PMHAP was an interagency, military to military initiative in charge of the Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program in Africa. The program was successful because it was truly integrated into broader host nation and USG HIV/AIDS programming. Other USG agencies appreciated that it served a distinct population (host nation military), which they could not fund, so it filled a specific niche and did not compete with their programs. Additionally, in some countries military medical establishments served the broader civilian community, which provided spillover

assistance from the military program, providing services to populations that might otherwise have been missed.

Putman noted that the DoD's HAO (Humanitarian Assistance-Other) program was the one that had raised the most controversy. It's Congressionally-stipulated regulations forced it to predict what it would need for disaster relief. Bad predictions resulted either in unspent funds at the end of the year or pulling funds from steady-state programs. This hampered relationship building. Under the Bush Administration, many HAO projects had been justified as part of the Global War on Terror policy, but there was less emphasis on that since 2008. HAO projects were intended to benefit disadvantaged or marginalized civilian populations and address basic human needs, but did not need to be attached to broader disaster responses, as they would be if conducted by the NGO community. HAO policy guidance states that projects are not supposed to involve economic development activities because that is USAID's responsibility. In some countries with limited or no USAID presence, or where use of other funds are constrained by Congressional intent, however, HAO has been an extremely useful tool for the Defense Attache and/or Ambassador, who at times utilized HAO programs as substitutes for USAID projects.

The idea of organizational and cultural differences amongst organizations reoccurred frequently in this panel. Panelists and participants noted that, in Africa negative feelings between NGOs and the military surface much less than in Afghanistan and Iraq. All the panelists were able to identify good instances of cooperation and using multiple agencies to achieve medical assistance. By understanding the limitations and strengths of each organization, more can happen in terms of medical engagements. The military does have more flexibility in its operations and can turn around money much more quickly than USAID. The military can be used to fill the gaps where NGOs and DoS are unable, whether due to funding issues or security. This panel concluded with a discussion of the issues of flexibility within the DoS and its programs.



Reducing Insecurity in Africa: Roles and Responsibilities of the U.S. Military, U.S. Government and Non-Governmental Communities

December 1-3, 2010

Casa Munras Hotel and Spa, Monterey, CA

Organized by the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

With sponsorship from the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Principal Organizer: Jessica Piombo, Associate Professor

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Wednesday, Dec 1 Conceptual Issues: Security and Development in Africa

Time

0815 - Breakfast
0845

0850 - Opening Remarks and Participant Introductions
1000

1000 - Panel One: Conceptualizing Security in Africa
1100 Facilitator: Laura Perazzola
Notes: Jason Neal
Terrence Lyons, George Mason University
"Governance and Security: The Politics of Civil War Onset, Endurance, and Resolution"
David Walter Dongo, Afrikan Community Empowerment Program (Uganda)
"Exploring the Relationship between Human and Traditional Security in Africa"

1100 - Break
1115

1115 - Briefing: U.S. Policies and Instruments
1145

Jessica Piombo, Naval Postgraduate School

“The U.S. Foreign Policy Universe: Primary Agency Authorities, Responsibilities and Jurisdictions”

1145– 1240	Panel Two: Intersections of Development and Security Part I: Conceptual Issues Facilitator: Jason Neal Notes: Laura Perazzola <i>Joseph Siegle, Africa Center for Strategic Studies</i> <i>“Identifying Stabilizing Development”</i> <i>Davin O’Regan, Africa Center for Strategic Studies</i> <i>“Pinpointing Transnational Crime on the Security-Development Spectrum”</i>
1240-1330	Lunch
1330 - 1445	Panel Three: Intersections of Development and Security Part II: Implications for Engagement Strategies Facilitator: Jason Neal Notes: Gustav Jordt <i>Clarence Bouchat, U.S. Army War College</i> <i>“The U.S. Military’s Interagency Role in African Development: Lead, Support, or More of the Same?”</i> <i>Jan Bachmann, University of Goteborg, Sweden</i> <i>“Laboratory AFRICOM: The Military’s Role in Security/Development Missions”</i> <i>Andrea Talentino, Drew University</i> <i>“Making the Difference Real: AFRICOM and the Future of the Development Command”</i>
1445- 1505	Break
1505 - 1630	Panel Four: The Role of the Civil Affairs Community Facilitator: Laura Perazzola Notes: Gustav Jordt <i>Brian McCartney, United States Africa Command</i> <i>“Where Defense Meets Diplomacy: Civil Affairs in the Unique African Operating Environment”</i> <i>Anna Simons, Naval Postgraduate School</i> <i>“Rethinking Civic Action”</i>
1630 - 1700	Plenary Discussion All

Thursday, Dec 2 U.S. Programs: Experiences and Evaluations	
0800 - 0830	Breakfast
0830 - 0845	Daily Opening & Admin Notes
0845 - 0945	<p>Panel Five: Development and Security in East Africa</p> <p>Facilitator: Gustav Jordt</p> <p>Notes: Jason Neal</p> <p><i>Jessica Piombo, Naval Postgraduate School</i> <i>“Military Provision of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: A Day in the Life of a Civil Affairs Team in the Horn of Africa”</i></p> <p><i>Maureen Farrell and Jessica Lee, United States Africa Command</i> <i>“Socio-Cultural Impact Evaluations of U.S. Civil Military Operations in East Africa: Assessing How Human Security Projects Affect Local Communities and Advance U.S. Government Objectives”</i></p> <p><i>Rebecca Mason and Brendan Sullivan, Educate! (Uganda)</i> <i>“The Relationship between Poverty and Conflict in a Weak State System: A Case Study Comparing Development Strategy in Somalia and Uganda”</i></p>
1000 - 1015	Break
1015 – 1100	<p>Panel Six: Maritime Security and the African Partnership Station</p> <p>Facilitator: Jason Neal</p> <p>Notes: Gustav Jordt</p> <p><i>Alison Rimsky Vernon, Margaux Daly and Veronica de Allende, Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)</i> <i>“Maritime Threats in Ghana: Mitigation and the role of Africa Partnership Station”</i></p> <p><i>Margaux Daly, CNA</i> <i>“Achieving Cooperative Security Goals: The Africa Partnership Station Experience”</i></p>
1100 - 1215	<p>Panel Seven: Interactions in the Field</p> <p>Facilitator: Gustav Jordt</p> <p>Notes: Laura Perazzola</p> <p><i>Richard Byess and Gene Bonaventure, United States Agency for International Development</i> <i>“Pardon Our Dust: Achieving Stability and Development in AFRICOM”</i></p> <p><i>G. William Anderson, Virginia Tech University/Independent Consultant</i> <i>“How Should USAID and DoD Work Together More Effectively in Africa?”</i></p> <p><i>Teresa Crawford and Trina Zwicker, Partners for Democratic Change and AFRICOM</i> <i>“Why does Africa Command Need an NGO Outreach Strategy?”</i></p>
1215 - 1315	Lunch
1315 - 1430	<p>Panel Eight: Security Sector Support and Capacity Building</p> <p>Facilitator: Laura Perazzola</p> <p>Notes: Jason Neal</p> <p><i>Dustin Sharp, University of San Diego</i> <i>“Addressing Accountability and Impunity in West Africa; A Critical Link in the Security-Development Nexus”</i></p> <p><i>Julius E. Nyang'oro, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Andrea M. Walther, Development Alternatives Incorporated</i> <i>“Security Sector Reform in Africa: Does AFRICOM Have a Seat at the Table?”</i></p> <p><i>Cliff Keller, United States Army Special Operations Command Headquarters (Fort Bragg)</i></p>

“Building Grassroots Sovereignty: A model for Security Force Assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”

1430 - 1500	Break	
1500 - 1615	Panel Nine: Health Programs Facilitator: Gustav Jordt Notes: Laura Perazzola <i>Diana B. Putman, United States Africa Command</i> <i>“Demonstrating U.S. Africa Command’s Value Added Through Implementing Quasi-Developmental Programs in Africa”</i> <i>Marla Haims, Gene Bonaventure and C. Ross Anthony, RAND Corporation</i> <i>“The Relationship between the Department of Defense and Non-Governmental Organizations in Complex Development: Enhancing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Health Assistance”</i>	
1615 - 1700	Plenary Discussion	All

Friday, Dec 3

Identifying Lessons, Challenges and Ways Forward

0800 - 0830	Breakfast	
0900-0915	Admin Notes	
0915-1000	Plenary Discussion: Key Debates and Issues Facilitator: Jessica Piombo	
1000 - 1015	Break	
1015-1030	Briefing: Working Group process, outputs and expectations	
1030 - 1130	Working Groups Part I: Nature of coordination and cooperation challenges	
1130 - 1230	Lunch	Working groups continue through lunch if necessary.
1230 - 1400	Working Groups Part II: Approaches to resolving or managing challenges, prepare report back presentation	
1400 - 1415	Break	
1415 - 1500	Working Groups Report Back	
1500 - 1545	General discussion on working group recommendations	All
1545 - 1630	Convener remarks, way forward discussion and workshop closure <i>Jessica Piombo, NPS</i> <i>David Hamon, DTRA-ASCO</i>	

**List of Participants and Affiliations
(Current as of December 2010)**

Name	Title	Affiliation
G. William Anderson	Independent Consultant	Virginia Tech University
Jan Bachmann	Postdoctoral Researcher	University of Gothenburg
Michael Bittrick	Deputy Director, Office of Regional and Security Affairs, Africa Bureau	U.S. Department of State
Eugene (Gene) Bonventre	Senior Conflict Advisor	USAID
Clarence J. Bouchat	Adjunct Professor	US Army War College
Richard Byess	Planning & Program Advisor	USAID
Teresa Crawford	Director, Sustainable Leadership Initiative	Partners for Democratic Change
Margaux Daly	Research Analyst	Center for Naval Analyses
David Walter Dongo	Executive Director	Afrikan Community Empowerment Program
Maureen Farrell	Social Scientist	AFRICOM
Marla Haims	Senior Management Scientist	RAND Corporation
Johnny Hall	LTC, U.S. Army Deputy Chief, DTRA Area Desk Office/AFRICOM	DTRA
David Hamon	Chief Scientist & Senior Research Advisor	DTRA
Cliff Keller	MAJ, USA	USASOC
Jessica Lee	East Africa Team Leader	AFRICOM
Terrence Lyons	Associate Professor	George Mason University
Rebecca Mason	Director of Operations	Educate!
Charles (Brian) McCartney	Master Sergeant, U.S. Army	AFRICOM

Section Four: Workshop Agenda

Davin O'Regan	Research Associate	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Jennifer Perry	Policy Analyst	DTRA
Jessica Piombo	Associate Professor	Naval Postgraduate School
Diana Putman	Chief, Humanitarian and Health Activities Branch	AFRICOM
Alison Rimsky Vernon	Research Analyst	Center for Naval Analyses
Dustin Sharp	Assistant Professor	University of San Diego
Anna Simons	Professor	Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School
Joseph Siegle	Director of Research	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Brendan Sullivan	Manager of Technology and Development	Educate! (Uganda)
Andrea Kathryn Talentino	Associate Professor	Drew University
Andrea Walther	Program Manager, Civil-Military Operations Training	Development Alternatives, Inc.
Trina Zwicker	NGO and Interagency Partnership Branch Chief, Outreach Directorate	AFRICOM
Gustav Jordt	MAJ, USAF	Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School
Jason Neal	LCDR, USN	Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School
Laura Perazzola	Capt., USMC	Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School
Alfred Woodson	Research Assistant	Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School
Sandra Leavitt	Deputy Director for Sponsored Research	Naval Postgraduate School